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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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COMPA::\Y, Administrator of the
E:~tates of' jl IXNI~TTA \V AiLKER,
nka ~·n~TT IJi: \VALE ER, deceased,
<md lLA MINN J1 ~rl 1 A vV ALKER,
(l(·cemwd, and JOHN A. WALKER,
d(•('f'at;ed, and R. J~. \VALKER,
mn1 A ·wALKER GROCK and
,\LTA F'AY WALKBR LAKE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
~\c:;TJ:0; \r.ALKEH,
Involuntary Plaintiff,
1

.J. B.

·w ALK ER,
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Case
No.
10286

YS

Defendant-Respondent.

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants
NATURE OF THE CASE

This i:-; a civil action by which plaintiffs-appellants
urig·11iall>» sought to have a constructive trust in their
favor imposed upon certain parcels of real property,
1

record title to which was in defendant-respondent. ThP
real property constitutes the bulk of the estate of .John
A. \Valker, Deceased, and the parties are his heirs, or
their personal representatives.
The complaint alleged defendant acted on behalf
of plaintiffs, or their predecessors in interest, in recovering title to the real property after it had been taken
by creditors through mortgage foreclosures or execution sales (R. 1, para. 6 and 12). By his answer, defendant denied any trusteeship or any beneficial interest
in plaintiffs or any of them (R. 9-10).
Thereafter, a written agreement between the parties
(Exh. P-7) was located supporting plaintiff's contentions. By the time of pre-trial, defendant had admitted ·
the genuineness of this 1922 agreement (R. 76-78), which
provided that he should have only a lien in the property
and that his lien should be limited to the amount he personally paid in satisfying certain previous liens against
the property, plus interest.
Trial proceeded on the theory that defendant held
title only to secure his lien and subject to an obligation
to convey the property to his co-heirs when the amount
of his lien had been paid to him. The purpose of the
trial was to determine the amount of defendant's lien
and to enforce his obligation to make appropriate conveyance upon the satisfaction of the lien (R. 107; 113).
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court determined the amount of defendantrespondent's lien to be $21,757.36, of which $5,614.00 is
2

principal and $1G,1-l-3.3G is interest. It ruled that plaintifi'I' \niuld havt> 30 days after demand by defendant to
pay tl1is a111ount, and if the payment were not made
,rithin that period, defendant would be released from
any obligation to convey plaintiff's property interest to
tlwm ( R :)3).
In making this determination, the trial court acknowledged that sonie or all of the $5,614.00 was actually paid
by a 11artnership of which defendant was at most an
p( ual partner with plaintiff R. E. Walker
(R. 419;
1
R. Ji'l). The court nevertheless gave defendant full
credit for all pay1rn~nts made by the partnership and held
defendant was entitlted to interest at 8% per annum
from the time those payments were made.

The court failed to make any finding as to tl1e
extent to which payments made by the partnership (and
for whielt defendant was given full credit) were made to
~atisfy obligations which the partnership had to the
J1~state of John A. vV alker, Deceased, although it was
tlu~ contention of plaintiffs that the partnership had
used at least $1,250.00 of the $5,614.00, and therefore,
by paying $1,~50.00 of the total was only fulfilling its
obligation to repay.
'I1he court further held that, upon defendant's purchase, in June of 1959, of plaintiff R. E. Walker's stock
in a corporation which had acquired some of the assets
of the partnership, defendant acquired any right R. E.
Walker might have had to be reimbursed for payments
rnadcc' hy the partnership in the acquisition of the propc~rty involved in this case.
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ltELIEl;' 80UG1IT O:\ APPEAL
Plaintiffs-appellant:::; S('Pk to have the canse re1naiided with instructions to the trial court that it ddPl'rnilJP
the amount of respond<c~nfs li,•n hy the following adju~I
men ts to ifa decree:
(a) Deduct $1,230.00 from tlw $5,(il-t.OO lll'incipal
amount in the decree. 'rl1is is one-fourth of the $3,00~.~ill
paid by tht• parhwrship to penwns nauwd Dayton on a
mortgage obligation, and represents $1,000.00 bono 1rn]
by the partnership for ih; business purposes on June 4,
1918. 'l'he partners used the estate property as secmity
for the loan, giving a mortgage on it ( Exh. P-28; Entn·
28 of Exh. D-30). One-fourth of the money borro1rPd
on the Dayton note and mortgage had been used to pa)·
off this $1,000.00 indebtedness. (R-228)
(b) Deduct from the balance 58.318 per cent 0t
whatever amount was actually paid by the partner~hip
(as opposed to defendant personally) in satisfying the
liens to which the 1922 contract relates. rrhe. 38.31S~i
represents the interest of R. E. vValker in the partnership
capital as of the time the partnership discontinued it
active business operations, and making this deduction
would give defendant reimbursement for his sharr of
the partnership's payments.
( d) Deduct $250.00 from the remammg principal
amount by reason of a payment received by respondent
in 19-±2 for a right of way over the subject propert)granted to \Vest Side vVater System (Entry 106, Ex!L
D-30), and adjust the interest computation for this 19-}~
receipt by defendant.

4

!Zc•(·ornpufr tlw interest payment on the principal
nl':·i\·(·;l at liy thi· for<>going adjustments.

i '')
c'illtt

I11 tlw altl'rnative, appellants seek to have this Court
l'tod; t\· tl1e DPeret~ relative to the amount due respondent
011 !ti;-; li(·11 to a total of $G,43G.31, consisting of principal
in the a1:10mit of $1,394.G7 and interest in the amount of
$;),0+ 1.0-1-. 'l'h('i-i(~ amounts are arrived at as follo\vs:
Prim:ipal Amount of Respondent's
per Dec.:ree
-------------------------------------

$5,614.00

Le::::s: Partnership obligation
satisfied with proceeds from
Dayton note and mortgage --------

($1,250.00)
$4,364.00

Balance _____ -----------------------------------LeRs: RE. Walker's Share of
partnership capital per partnershi pbooks, not recoverable by
rec;pondent ( 58.318 % of
$cl "-QL1. 00) __ -.. --.. ----- --- ----· ---·--------·-··

( $2,545.00)
$1,819.00

Ba!D.nce
Less: Amount received by
Respondent for right of way _____ _

($ 250.00)
$1,5'69.00

Balance -----------------------------------------Plus: Interest as follows:
8% of $1,819.00 for 20 years
(I 922-42) ---------------------------------8% of $1,569.00 for 22 years
(l!M2-64) ---------------------------------Total Interest ____________________
Total Amount of respondent's
expenditures and interest _______ _
Eight-Ninths of Above
figure =$6,436.31.
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$2,910.40
2,761.44
$5,671.84
$7,240.84

from 1919 until 192± when he got married. He was run.
ning the teams and working on the farm. J. B. \Valhi·
had several jobs until 1920 when he devoted his full effort to the hauling business (R. 387; R. 218). The naturp
of the entity which operated the hauling business was not
expressed in any formal instrument, but the business
was known as the J. B. and R. 1£. Vv alker Truckinab
Company ( R. 362), and was represented to be a part.
nership of J. B. \Valker and R. 1£. vValker (R. 222-220;
R. 383).
In 1917, the business obtained a truck, and Minetta
vValker mortgaged a portion of the family property to
obtain loans for this purpose ( Exh. P-29, R. 220). Tht>reaf ter, another truck was acquired, and J. B. and R. E.
Walker mortgaged their interest in the estate property
to obtain the down payment for this truck in the amount
of $1,000.00. (Exh. P-28; R. 221; R. 183; R. 378). The
latter mortgage was placed on the property in June of
1918 (Exh. P-28).
On July 12, 1920, a mortgage covering the orange
property was given to secure a $±,000.00 loan made by all
of the heirs of J olm A. Walker. (Entry 39 of Exh. D-30).
Of the $±,000.00 obtained, $1,000.00 was used to discharge
the mortgage of J. B. and R. E. vValker which had been
placed on the property to get the second truck. (R. 228;
R. 183; Marginal Release, Exh. P-28). This mortgage
of July 12, 1920, will be referred to as the Dayton mortgage in this brief. Having used $1,000.00 of the $4,000.00
received on the Dayton note and mortgage to discharge
their debt for the truck, J. B. and R. E. Walker's truck-
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ing 1inrtn('}'sltip had a clear duty to pay off at least onefomtlt or tlw Dayton mortgage debt.
Tlw Dayton mortgag<~ was not paid and a judgment
\\'a~; cntt·n·d in .January of 1922. The property was sold
nt a slwriff's sale on February 10, 1922 to l\lr. Dayton
(Entry OG of Exh. D-30).
ln ~eptt~mber of 1919 and April of 1922, two judgmc•nts were rendered against the Union Co-operative
)fprcantik Company (the store was operated by the
fmnily in this name) in favor of the Utah Association of
Credit Men, and the green parcels of land were subse(iiwntly sold on a sheriff's sale for $250.00 and $25.00
l'('Speetivel y (En tries 53 and 56 of Exh. D-30).
In this setting, the family entered into the agreernen ts which are dated October 9, 1922 (Exh. P-5, P-7).
Urn· of th<:•se is between members of the family and the
Daytons which is a contract for the purchase by the
family of the orange tract of land from the Daytons,
direding that a deed running to respondent be delivered
upon final payment of a purchase price of $5,002.50.
rrJip ot]H'l' contract is between the members Of the family
tlH!lllselves \vhich provides that respondent will make
a diligt-nt effort, although he is in no sense obligated,
to pay th<~ Dayton mortgage, expenses of administration
of his father's estate and expenses in pursuing a con',1emnatiou case which was then pending. The contract
abo provided that respondent would have a lien against
the prn1ierty for all "payments made by second party
[respondent] pursuant to the terms of this agreement."
9

Although there is some question about when the signa.
tures of the parties were affixed and by vYhom, tb
adult mt-mbers of the family entered into the contract

1

\Vithout question, the Dayton obligation was sati~
fied. Further, the Union properties were assigned tu
respondent by sheriff's deeds. There is also no question
about the source of these payments. Essentially all or
the moneys paid for these properties came from the
trucking business. ( R. 228-229; R. 362). The books or
account of the J.B. and R. E. trucking company partnership show the properties as partnership assets. (Exl1.
D-26; Exh. P-27 ; Exh. P-32; R. 235)
vVhen partnership funds were expended for th1,
purpose for which respondent seeks to establish a lien
in the amount of the entire expenditure, the expenditures
were set up on the books as partnership real estate and
were not charged to respondent's capital account. (H.
272-273).
All of the family continued to live in the family home
until 1920, when Fay Walker left. In 1924 R. E. Walker
was married and moved out of the home. (R. 309; R.211)
J. B. Walker and his family lived in the home with his
mother and the younger children until 1931. (R. 211)
In July of 1933, a corporation, J.B. and R. E. Walker, Inc. was formed. Five Thousand shares of $1.00 par
were issued, mainly to J.B. and R. E. Walker. According
to the Articles of Incorporation, the corporation received,
as consideration for the shares so issued, exactly this:
10

"The good ·will and business created bv the
co-partnPrship of J. B. and R. E. "\Valker." (Exh.
D-2f))
;\ t the corporation~s inception, there were no ledger

aceonnts established, and the only book ever maintained
1rns a ea::;h book, which did not show the assets and liabilities of the business. (R. 267-268).

nw

only indicia of ownership of partnership assets
which \\'('l'P transfered to the corporation were the certificatPs of title to the trucks as they were registered for
lieense plates. (R 195; R. 259). The stocks and securities of the partnership were not transferred to the corporation (H. 194; R. 404-405) No conveyance of the
.J olm A. YI' alker Estate property was ever made to the
corporation by any instrument, recorded or otherwise.
As of DecPmber 31, 1932, the last time that partnership tntl'ies were made, the capital account of J. B.
\Yalb~r amounted to $29,143.30 and that of R. E. Walker
was $40,775.01 (R. 272). Of the total capital in the
partnership, R. E. vValker had 58.318 per cent, and J. B.
WalkN had 41.682 per cent. The corporation stock was
iswe1l equally to J. B. and R. E. ·walker (Exh. D-25) .
.l'ilr. Cope, a certified public accountant, testified
that he had examined the books of the partnership and
reeords of the corporation over an extended period bet\\'PPn 1\1 arch 1958 and September 1958, and that he had
attempted to reconcile the ending of the partnership
1rith tlu-\ L<>ginning of the corporation. He found that
the two eould not be reconciled (R. Z77).
11

In 1939, J. B. and R. E. \V alker were involved in:
law suit with one another as a result of ·which res1ion<le 111
bought all of H. K \Valk(~r's stock in the J. B. and Rt
vValker, Inc. 'l'lw purchase was made pursuant to a
written agreernen t between them ( Exh. P-31). 1'] 11.
agreement (1) reeognizecl that there was still a partner.
ship having assets subject to conveyance, and ( 2) prn
vided specifically that respondent was not getting any
rights in the property of the John A. \V alker Estate.
The settlement was worked out carefully between the
parties and their counsel and, with most particular
language, rest' rved R. E. ·walker's rights in the estate
property from the assignment.
Disregarding the clear intent of the parties l'X·
pressed in the agreement, the trial court ruled that IJ)
this agreement respondent bought out R. E. vValker's
interest in the partnership without any reservations.
Since the partnership had made the payments for th1·
acquisition of the orange property from the Dayton1
and the green property from the Utah Association of
Credit Men, the court concluded that the assignment in
the 1959 agreement gave respondent the right to reirnbursement, under the 1922 agreement, for all rnoneyi
paid by the partnership. The trial court refused to per·
mit counsel to examine respondent regarding whiclt
pay~nents were made by him and which were made by tbe
partnership ( R. 371). The court ignored the extensin
provisions of the 1959 agreement expressly reserving
from the assignment the rights to reimbursement for
moneys paid on behalf of the J olm A. vValker Estate.
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F'ollowinµ; thL' trial court's ruling on the effect of
tlw :'"tlle111P11t agreument, plaintiffs asked leave to
, 1111 t·iltl tl1(' conqilaint to assert a bar of the statute of
Jilllitatiorn-: against n'spondent's lien including any moni» s paid by the partnership, the corporation, or R. E.
\Yalk<'r ( H. 385).

The J mrtnership books of account clearly show the
properties aequired by payments made to the Daytons
(11ltid1 anwmited to $5,002.50 of the $5,614.00 in the decree) \1·ere picked up and carried as a partnership asset.
~1imilady, Uie $42G.40 a-vvarded in the decree for the two
UJJion lots (green property) resulted in an acquisition
t'l10\rn as au asset of the partnership. (Exh. D-26; R. 235 ).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET-OFF
AGAINST AMOUNTS PAID BY THE PARTNERSHIP AT
LEAST $1,250.00 WHICH THE PARTNERSHIP HAD THE
PRIMARY DUTY TO PAY.

The Dayton mortgage represented security for a
$-±,U00.00 Joan made upon the note of all the heirs of
.John A. \Valker, Deceased. There is no conflict in the
Pridc'rn:e that, when the money was obtained in 1920,
$1 !000.00 ( onP-fourth of the $-1,000.00) was required to
rliseharg<> a previous mortgage placed on the property
h~-' rt>spmHJrnt and appellant R. E. Walker (Entry 39
of Exh. D-30; Exh. P-28; R. 183; R.. 228).
there is no conflict in the evidence that
tJ1e> mortgag<> placed on the estate property by respond~irnilarly,

13

and 11. E. \Valker in June of 1918 waa to obtain $1.
000.00 for a truek used in the partnernhip husim•aa rn.
221; R. 183).
1c~nt

It ,,·ould therefore aPlwar clear that, at the moment
the Dayton mortgage was plact~d upon the property,
the heirs of J olm A. \V alker would have a claim again, 1
the partnel'Ship and J. B. and R. E. \ValkPr for the $1,000.00 debt which had been paid off.

Following the Dayton foreelosure, the reacquisition of the pro1wrty by reapondent was made with im·t
nership funds. ( ~ee stipulation of counsel at page 311
of the Record; Exh. D-26; R. 235)
The trial court plainly stated its conviction that
respondent should be given credit for all payments mad~
by himself or the J. B. and R. B. \Valker Trucking partnership (R. 370). Further, the court did not permit am
set-off for the obligations of the partnership to tlw
John A. "\V alker estate. The propriety of the trial court'i
ruling relative to giving respondent credit for all payments made by the partnership will be argued in another point. At this point the merits of the set-off will
be discussed.
The 1922 agreement among the members of th~
Walker family (Exhibit P-7) constitutes a memorandum
of the understanding between respondent on the om
hand and his mother and siblings (some of whom wm
still minors) on the other. It obligates respondent to du
nothing except use his best efforts to clear up the Day-
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i1t1H·tgage matter and other specified expenses. It
j;; a pnsonal agreement with respondent providing for
Jii:-: n·i111h:1rs<•J1wnt with interest of money which he pays
i>tll ol' !iii; own pocket. It gin•s him a lien agaim;t the
pni]l\'l'l)' l'or sums which he pays. It says nothing about
tlw 1da]Jfodurn~nt of a liPn in the event the partnership
or any.inl' <'Is<> makes any of the payments.

tim

,\pp1·liants will concede the equity of g1vrng re~pornh11 en·dit for iiayments made by the partnership
to tlw {'.Xf (•nt of respondent's interest in the partnership
1•\'(•1t t!tonglt sneh payments were not technically made by
!Jim 1\·itl1in the purview of the 1922 agreement. However,
this er<'dit should be given only after the total payments
1w.1dP by tlu' partnership have been reduced by the
;11110unt ,,·Jiieh the partnership owed to the estate.
Tlu• e\·idence clearly establishes that, by 1918, the

Jmsin<':·;s \Vas 01wrated as a partnership between
r1·:sp0Jl(lent and R. E. '\V alker. In l\Iarch of that year,
I l1Py n•pn·sent<·<l themselves to be a partnership in a procc1::ding before the I11dustrial Commission (R-222, 223; R.
:;'):J). Jn .J mie of 1918, they jointly executed a mortgage
(Jf tlt1 ir interest in the .John A ...Walker Estate above
rl'l'en1·cl to so they could acquire a truck (Exh. P-28).
lr1;c·ki1;~<

It app1•:u·s from the record that the partnership
ow1•d the .John A. Walker Estate and the family a great
\lPnl more than the duty to pay back money borrowed for
H:'e in th(_• business. r:L'he partnership initially used the
farm anintals and farm equipment for hauling; it used
tltt- <';-,;tat~' land as security in borrowing money for
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trucks, and it u~ed the land as its base of 01wrntiu 11 .,
feeding and shelkring its temnsten;. rrhe parbwrs tli(•J11
selves owed a great deal to the family, whieh had ]Jtl
them through eollegr despite serious financial hardship~
and \\'as providing tlwm \rith their own residenePs. T]i,
store had also served the partnership by providing sui1
plies and gasoline. (R-21G, 214, 220, 221, 226, 227)
The value of these goods and services cannnot nu\i.
be established, and the trial court saw no legal duty 01
the partnership to pay for them. However, as to tl1t
$1,000.00 of the Dayton mortgage money which was us0ri
to discharge the partnership's debt, both the amount allll
the dirPet benefit an~ clearly established from the t>ridence. rrhe 1922 contract cannot logically or even rationally be construed to mean that respondent should han
a lien against the estate property if the partnership npaid the $1,000.00 of the Dayton mortgage money whiclt
was used to satisfy its own previous note and mortgage.
The ruling of the trial court goes even one step fur.
ther. It provides that respondent is entitled to have tht
heirs of John A. Vvalker not only reimburse him for the
money paid by the partnership to discharge its O\rlt
obligation, but also pay him 3.36 times the amount of thi1
payment in interest.

It should be noted that the decree gives respondent
credit for $5,002.50, being the principal amount the partnership paid the Daytons. Since one-fourth of the Dayton mortgage money went to the benefit of the partnership, the off-set should be one-fourth of the $5,00~.:J(I
16

,·1·1·di1

g'I\'('])

rt>spornknt b:-· the trial eourt's Ll(·cn·e or

'

~:; 1. ;_:;-;: 1.1 lO.

\ \' (· s ii brn it that the trial court l'rred in not allowing
a :-:d-off or $1,~50.00 against the• $3,Gl-1.00 principal

amount (1ctnmillcd to he Llue respondent.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ACQUIRED ALL OF THE PARTNERSHIP'S RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTIES OF THE JOHN A.
WALKER EST A TE.

TJu, evid(•nce offered m the trial of this case is un('ontrowrkd that all monies paid for the re-acquisition
ot' tlir properties covered by the Dayton mortgage and
t11os( ineludf'<l in the Utah Association of Credit Men
execution sale were from the ·walker Trucking Company
(_·o-parbwrship, in which respondent and appellant R. E.
\r aJker '\\"('n~ partners. (R. 257; R. 235; Stipulation of
(·ounse1 H. :-rt 1, Exh. D-:26 at page 21.)
1

The trial eourt repeatedly expressed its conviction
tlrni n"spond(~nt had finally bought out R. E. ·walker in
till' partnership which paid the $5,614.00 here in issue,
a11d hall therefore acquired any right his partner had
to lw r<'irnlmrscd for partnership funds expended for the
.1 ohn A. Walker Estate. At page 370 of the record, the
comt snid:

"I am going to hold that any money that's

vaid by the partnership or the corporation
or .T. B. \Valker he is entitled to get eight-ninths
of' it back."
lwL•n
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Again, at page 412 of the record, the court said:
"He may have paid for it by partnershi1)1
funds, but he has bought his partner out.''
Also at page 36G-"I of the record, ·we find:
"l\IR. CUTHBERT: The only reason for
presenbng nfr. Cope's evidence was in rebuttal
of l\[r. \Valker's statement that he had charged
all the items to draws that had been paid by the
partnership.
1

•'T HJ~ COURT: This is what I understand,
and I did not think that made any difference hecause lw's bought R. E. \Valker out, and he's
paid all that's been paid on this."
The evidence in this case ,,·ill not sustain a finding
that respondent ever acquired the rights of his partner,
Appellant R. E. \Valker, to be reimbursed for arnount8
expended by the partnership for the estate nor that the
property interests of the partnership in the John A.
\Valker Estate properties were ever transferred to J. B.
and R. E. Walker Incorporated.
Looking first at the question of whether the partnership's interest in the John A. \Valker Estate properties
was transferred to the corporation, there are several
factors indicating no transfer vvas ever made or intended
to be made.
:B..,irst, there was no com·eyance of any form from
J. B. Walker, who took record title to the properties,
to the corporation ( Exh. D-30 ; R. 192-3). Although a
holding of property in the name of one partner is consistent with its being a partnership asset under Section
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JU ol' the llniform Partnership Act. (Section 48-1-7, Utah
( 'ude ,\1111otaiec1, 1953), such a holding is not consistent
11 i1l1 a l'Orporation 's ownership of an asset.
Secolld, although the partnership books clearly show

assets to be part11ership assets, there is no accountiug record by which the properties are treated as a corporate assd.
j!Jc~e

Thi rel, tlw Articles of Incorporation specifies that
the eorporation is receiving, in payment for the shares
ir;r-;1w1l, "tlw good will and business created by the copartnL·rship of J. B. & R. E. Walker." This language
makes llO reference to the transfer of any tangible assets
of the partnership, nor is it in the broad form frequently
found iu sud1 documents of all of the assets and liabilifa·s of the partnership. The language used is consistent
\\ith a transfer of only the operating assets of the part11,•rship without a transfer of the investment assets.

Fourth, the capital accounts of J. B. Walker and R.
K \Valker \Vere not equal at the time of incorporation.
K E. \Valker's capital account amounted to $40,775.01
arn1 .J. B. Walker's was $29,143.30 (R. 272). The stock
of the corporation was issued equally ( Exh. D-25). This
issuance of equal stock would be consistent with an incuq)Oration of only part of the assets of the partnership
whif'h ·would result in withdrawals from each of the partnn's eapital accounts of an equal amount, but not with
an i11corporation of all of the assets of the partnership .

.P'ifth, l\Ir. Cope, a certified public accountant, who
workf.d on the corporation books extensively in 1958,
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m attempting to n'conrile the assds of the partn('l'shi]i
with those of the corporation, te::;tified that from an accounting standpoint it was not possible to n·co1wile thi·
eorporntion as Jw:ng a suc·eessor of tlH' partnership. (11.
~77)

8ixth, the testimony of res1)0ndent is that he diu
not makP a tl-ansfer of any of the indicia of mn1ership
of the real property involved in this action, or the stoek~
and bonds of the partnership (except for a fow shares of
one company). l le te:::itii'il'<l that he had tr an sf erred the
tith's of the <'lluipment. ( R 192-5). This is consistent
with the testimony of Appellant R. E. \Valker that olll)
the equipme11t rtrnl operating assets of the partnership
were transferred to the corporation (R. 259).
Seventh, the agreeuwnt of respondent and R. E.
\Valker, in settlement of their Ia-wsuit, contains an agreement by R ..K \Valker to assign to respondent his intereset in the partnership, except for the properties involnd
in this action (Exh. P-31). This is clearly indicative tlrnt
in June of 1959 the parties considered that the properti~i
in this action and otlwr assets were still in the imrbwrship. If all assets of the partnership had been transfenrrl
to the corporation, there would have been no occasion
to get an assignmPnt and deed from R. E. \Valker of hi.'
interest in the paitnaship.
It is submitted that there vrns no transfer of the
properties involved in this action from the partnershi1 1
to the corporation, and that the court erred in so finding.
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Tlwr<'i'on•, h)- acquiring tlw corporate stod~ of H. E.
\\";tll~,.1·, n·:-:pond1•nt C'.ould not have ac<1uired the rights
((l n·illll>nrs('lllic'llt even if the agreement by ·which he
aeq n i n·d H. K \Y alkt>r's stoC'.k had been silent on the
snl1j1•ct.
The agT('t'llwnt of June, 1959, was not silent on the
subj<·ct ( E:\.h. P-31). It contains paragraphs which are
111 ost p<'rtin<·nt and enlightening as to the parties' understamli11g about th<-> rights of reimbursement. First, they
n·(·ogni1wd that the partnership retained some assets,
and particnlarly those relating to the John A. "\Valker
('stat1: propt>rty and the Union property. The agreement
11f lt K \Valk<·r in that instrument reads as follows:
'' 2. [H. E. vValker agrees] to assign and
<1uitclaim any interest he has in the old partnership known as "\Valker Trucking Co. and in the
·wa Iker Saud and Gravel, a co-partnership, except
that nothing herein contained shall be construed
as a wain•r on the part of the party of the second
part IR. K vValker] of any claims he may have
to the ,John Alvin Walker Estate or the Union
prnperty as mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
tlie mutual covenants.
f:\t>c011c1ly, the parties to the agreement anticipated
the \T»ry issue which is now in litigation-to what extent
should rf•spondent get credit against the estate for payment:, niadP by the partnership to acquire or maintain
th1· i>stah· prorwrty hy reason of acquiring R. E. vValker's
int1•r\:.•st in tlw corporation t It is difficult to conceive how
t lit> nlldl'rstanding that respondent should not acquire any
n1lditional rights could be more clearly stated that in the
followi11g two sections of the agreement:
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"3. It is understood and agreed that thi're
expressly reserved and excluded from tht~ ten1 .
and provisions oi• this
agreement ' and froni <·a111.11
•
relt·ases :xecuted mc1dent thereto, all interest th;t
the parties hereto may have or claim to haw iri
the property of the John Alvin Walker Estat
and that nothing herein contained shall he l'P'
garded or construed as an admiE,sion on the part
of either party that either or both of said partiP,
shall have, or has, any right title or interest in
or to said property, and that said property, anu
all incidents thereof including any and all rnatter1.
or to soitrce of /mids involved in the acq11isitirn
or maintenance of said property, are retained bY
the respective parties the same as though thi·,
agreement were never made."
JS

,
1

1

"4. It is understood and agreed that tlmr,
is expJ"essly reserved and excluded from the term'
and provisions of this agreement, and from any
released executed incident thereto, all intrrM
that the parties hereto may have or claim to
have in two pieces of real estate in Union, Utah.
and that nothing herein contained shall be n
garded or construed as an admission on the par!
of either party that either or both of said partie.•
shall have, or has, any right, title or interest in
or to said property and that said property, and
all incidents thereof, including any and all mat
ters, or to source of funds involved in the acq11i·
sition or maintenance of said property, are re
tained by the respective parties the same a1
though this agreement were never made." [Emphasis added.]
Considering that approximately one-half of th 1'
agreement, exclusive of recitals and property descri11tions, is devoted to the above language, one must assume
that the parties felt the above language an important
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1,nd qf tli<'ir rn·gotiations. Keverthel<·ss the trial court
i·uiupl1·idy iµ;nored the agreement and the result the
qiwt1·cl languag1~ songht to accomplish between the par1ies, a]j(l refus1•d to listen to evidence relating to the
nnd1•rstanding (H. 371). The court sustained objections
to inti·u(lndion of this evidence, so an offer of proof
\I'll s mad<· ( H. :r11).

ln vi1•\\' of the overwhelming evidence and virtual
:;tipulation that all of the expenditures for which respondt·nt f'!airns a lit•n were made by the partnership, and
in Yi('w of tlu~ great care with which R. E. vValker retained his rights to reimbursement for his share of
iiartnersliip exrwnditures for the estate, we submit that
the trial court erred in holding that respondent had
?eqnirea the right to reimbursement for all money paid
Ji~- hirn~wlf, the partnership or the corporation the same
as if he had made all the payments out of his own pocket.
As noted above, the capital accounts of the partnership at the tiirn) of incorporation of the corporation
~tood 'rith respondent having 41.682 per cent of the net
worth of the partnership and R. E. Walker having 58.318
lh'l Ct'Jlt. rl_1Jie incorporation of certain assets of the partn<,rship, with the stock for those assets being issued
1·qnally, would result in equal reductions in the dollar
amount uf each partner's capital account. The dollar
difft'l'Pnee i11 the capital accounts after such withdrawal
wonld be a gn•ater percentage of the whole net worth of
th 0 partnership, so the effect would be to increase R. E.
\Valktir's perePntage of the capital and reduce respondent's. f-lince tlw evidence is not available as to how
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much \Yas in fad \\-it!J(ll'a\Yn from thP partnerslti]i, a11 _
pc!lant \; co11km1 the principal amount of respondent',
lie11 should 11<> l'P(lneecl hy at l<•ast 5S.:ns lH'1· (·Pnt.
POINT III
EVEN IF DEFENDANT RESPONDENT HAD AC.
QUIRED ALL HIS PARTNER'S RIGHTS TO REIMBURSEMENT BY THEIR 1%9 AGREEJ\IENT, THE COURT ERRED
IN HOLDING DEFENDANT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO INTEREST FROM 1922 INSTEAD OF FRmr
1959 WHEN HE ACTUALLY PAID THE MONEY FOR REIMBURSEMENT RIGHTS.

r_}'he tr]al court ap1wared to n'cognizP that any claim
defendant n·spondent might make to having "bought
his partner out" must be bast>d on fop 1959 agreenwnt
betwetin them (Exhibit P-31).
Ass'..uning (although this violates the letter a111l
spirit of the agn't>ill<'nt) that d<'frndant-respondent somehow acquired his partner's rights to reimburse11wnt h)
that agreement, we would point out that his partnel'.
plaintiff appellant R. I<~. \Valker, had no i·ights of any
kind und<ff the 1922 contract \\'hich is th<' basis of this
litigation. The only party to the 19:22 contract who l1a~
rights to reimbursement is defendant respondent and lll'
is entitled to reimhursic•ment \\·ith interest from his co·
heirs but only for amounts b_• pi:>rsonally pays. Hr i~
only entitled to inh·n·st, fnrthennon·, from th<~ date h~
personally makes an expenditure on behalf of the estat1'
and is eonseqlwntly "out of pocket."
Defendant-respondent was cPrtainly not out of pork·
et with reference to expenditures made by R. E. Walhr
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iUwr as an individual or as tlw major partiwr in tlw
.1. I\. IC J·:. \\"alkn iiartnnshi1J) until lw (by tlw trial
""mt's inn<·dihl<> ('Onstrnetion of Exhibit J>-:·H) bought
1dtat('\"<·r rigltts I.{. E. Walk('l' had in 1939. Defendant
n·;-;pornl<'nt sl1ould not, in equitr, be given credit for his
l~';)~J 1•:,]H'rnliture as if he had made it in 1922.
1,

n·-<·mphasiie that R. E. ·walker had no
rjgltts under the 1922 contract. If
B. \Valker acquired
H. K Walkt>r':-; rights to reimbursement (despite R. E.
\\'alkPr's ('onsistt>nt attempts to retain those rights),
1111· rights so acquired have tht>ir basis in general prinl'ipl1·s of law and not in the 1922 contract. rrhere is no
pussihl1' basis on ·which R. E. \Valker could have been
e11titl<'d to reimbursement plus interest at 8 per cent
sine<' tlH~ !('gal rate of interest is only G per cent.

\Y<'

\1·01dd

.r.

Ln making this argument, we do not retreat, of
coLm.;e, from our basic position ( 1) that no rights with
refrren<'e to the estate property were ever conveyed to
the ('Orporation, (2) that R. E. \Yalhr preserved for
himsP!f all rights to reimbursement derived from his
slutn' of partnership money used for estate purposes
and (:i) that, by acquiring all the stock in the corporation, dd<'ndant-respondent could not have ac(1uired any
riglits with reference to the estate property.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS-APPF:LLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THE FINDINGS AND
.JUDGMENT TO PROVIDE THAT, IN THE EVENT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S LIEN WITHIN THIRTY
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DAYS AFTER DEMAND, THEN DEFENDANT-RESPON.
DENT SHOULD BE ENTITLED ONLY TO FORECLOSE
HIS LIEN.

The history of the \Valker family possession of thi·
property in litigation has (since the Dayton mortgagt
and other liens wPre discharged) been that Minnetta
\Valker, the mother of the living litigants, occupi\•d tlie
home and exercised some dominion over it until lier
death in 1959 at the age of eight-six. For about t1·n
years after the 1922 agreement, defendant-respondent
and his wife and family lived in the home too (R-:211).
All the children assmned that, -when their mother dircL
an equitable division of the property would be made
with appropriatt~ consideration being given to the 19~~
efforts of tht> two oldest children to preserve the estatl·.

It was not until 1960, after Minetta's death, that the
intention of defendant-respondent to disenfranchise hi'
brothers and sisters became known. It -was not until
after the judgment in this action was filed that demand
was made upon plaintiffs-appellants to produce tlw
$20,000.00 which the Court had found to be the amount
of the lien.
The property in litigation has been appraised at
approximately $80,000.00 but the interest of plaintiffsappellants is an undivided interest, and the lands are
for the most part unimproved. As a matter of banking
practice, loans on unimproved lands are not made, par·
ticularly where the prospective borrower can only encumber an undivided interest. The trial court decreed
that, if plaintiffs-appellants failed to raise $20,000.00
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'·' it!i m tlti rty days afh·r demand, their entire interest
.-lio111ld IH' forfPifr<l, and defendant-respondent would then

Jwlu the entire estate free of any rlaim by them.
Tlie ]>radical effect of the decree is to work a for-

fri tun· of the inh•n·sts of all the heirs of John A.
Walker except defendant-rPspondent. This is most cer-

tainly not the spirit or the content of the 1922 agreement.
TJiat agn~ernent provides that defendant-respondent
shall have a lien only, a lien which he might establish
at an)' time hy making demand on his co-heirs for payment, hut nonetheless a mere lien.
Hecognizing the imminence of forfeiture, plaintiffsappellants moved (R-86, 87) to have the judgment
amen<l(•d, and the Court denied the motion.
In ('Ss<>nee, the deed by which defendant-respondent
acquin•d his title was a mortgage of a kind which this
Court ha8 often recognized (Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah
4Ji2, 189 P.2d 118;Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 Pac.
232). His lien is an obligation established by an instruHH~nt in writing which did not, in terms, contemplate any
r:Oll\'('Yance to defendant-respondent.
The procedure for the recovery of a debt or the
ellforccment of a right secured by a mortgage upon real
estate is statutory, in this state, and the statutory foredoHure procedure is the only procedure by which a
li 0 n may be enforced. Section 78-37-1, U.C.A. 1953 reads
as follcnrn:

''There can be but one action for the recovery
of a11y debt or the enforcement of any right se27

eun•d L~- rnortµ;ap;(' npon !'<>al ('Slat<• or jJ('J'S'.mnl
property, which action nrn:-;t }w in ac<·o1'(1arn·<· wit],
the provisions of this ehapt('l'. .Jndµ;rn<>Ht sltal! J11'.

given adjudging tlw amount duP, \Yitli eosb and
disbUl'Sl'lllents, and the salP of tlH' rnortgn;.:·t·(i
property, or SOll!l' part tlwn•of, to satisl\ sair]
amount and accruing eosts ' and din·di1w
tl• 11 •
h
sh(•rif f to procl•ed and s<·ll the sam<' aeconling t:i
the prnvisions of law J'('lating to sal(•s OH PX<·cution, and a special <'Xt>eution or ord<>r of sa] 1•
shall be issued for that purpose.
\Vlwn the trial court denit>d tlw motion to m~Mid
the judg11wnt to l'l'qnire foi't>elosnn• and iwrsi:-;trd iil ib
decree that the substantial intPrPst of plaintifL-a1ipl·1
lants be forf'eitt>d \Yithont l10pt• of redemption unl<·~,
they produce a sum it is not in thtiir })OW\l' to producP,
the Court aetecl against the l~,_,,. and against furnlm1wn'«1:
pl'inciples of jurisprmknt'c.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, BY ACQUIRING ALL OF THE STOCK IN J.B. AND R. E. WALKER, INC ..
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ACQUIRED ANY RIGHTS TO
REIMBURSEl\IENT FROM THE ESTATE OF JOHN A
WALKER SINCE ANY RIGHTS OF THAT CORPORATIO~
WHETHER ACQUIRED FROM THE R. E.-J. B. WALKER
PARTNERSHIP OR OTHERWISE - WERE BARRED BY
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.

As we hav<:> voirited out in argument unclN pn·vio111
points, the .Court repeatedly ltelcl that defendant-n,:.;ponclent should have credit for all expenditures contemplafrcl

by the 1922 contract whether they were in faet mml1' h:
himself, the J. B.-R. E. ~Walker partnel'ship or .J. H.
and R. E. \Valker, Inc.
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'l'lw ( 'omt\i th< ory, if we urnl<·rstand it, is that the
par!r1••1;-;liip '"·a:-: <·ntitled to h<~ reimburs0d for <'x1wnditun·:-; tnad<' IJ~· it on behalf of tlw estatP - quite apart
!'rn1n (}w 1!):.!~ agr<'ement - and dpfendant-respondent
acqni r1·d tlimw rights when tie acquic·ed the total stock
in tlw corporation.
1

W<· Jwv<· already pointed out that the corporation
E. \Valk<~r's or the partnership's
1wwr acq 11ire<l R
rigl1b '' ith rd<'n·nce to the estate. Those rights were
iWY<'l' com'f',\'Cd to the corporation, and they were, in
l'~wt, ean•fully preserved to plaintiff-appellant R. I~.
\Yalker in <'Y<>ry a('count, record, contract and written
1nrn:.;adio11. ThP trial court simply ignored the nass
of \nitkn <·vi<lPnce that defendant-respondent had not
pcr;-;onall~· paid the Dayton mortgage and had not ac1111in·d tlw rights to n•imbursement of the partnership,
wltid1 n ally paid it, or plaintiff-appellant R. E. \Valker.
Th<· trial eonrt would not even receive evidence of the
t>xtent 10 which payments had been made out of partner~:li1p funds.
1

En n if, by acquiring the total issued stock, defen1

had acquired whatever rights the partJWtship or corporation had, hO\\Yver, we submit that
iwitlH·r <·ntity had any rights.

(~a1tl-respomlPnt

:\ eitlwr tlw partnership nor the corporation was a
rnrt>· to tli1· J ~l22 eon tract an<l there is no instrument
('~tal>Ji:-;liil1g Ow right of either to sit on its rights to
l'(·i111liu l':-:e111<•nt or to have a lien in the property. Each
had a h·g-al or t>quitable right to be reimbursed by the
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estate for expenditures made on the estate's behalf.
Neither made a claim, however, within six or even ten
years after the expenditure was made. Defendant-rp
spondent could not, by acquiring the corporation's stock
acquire any right the corporation did not then hare.
rrhe corporation's rights, if any it ever had, had lonnb
since become unenforceable by reason of the limitations
of actions provisions of the Utah Code. \Ve assume Section 78-12-25 would be the applicable provision, but wr
are aware of no kind of action which may be asserter!
forty years after it arises.
I

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs-appellants do not seek to keep from defendant-respondent any profit or advantage to which be
is entitled under the 1922 contract. To the extent that
he was out of pocket in arranging for the payment of
the Dayton mortgage and the other expenditures whicl1
are the subject of the 1922 contract, plaintiffs belieYe
he should be fully reimbursed with interest.
Plaintiffs-appellants cannot agree, however, that
defendant-respondent should be reimbursed for expenditures made by someone else. They are even ·willing that
he should be given credit for having paid a part of
the amounts really paid by the partnership. No possible
basis is seen, however, for crediting defendant-respun·
dent with all the payments made by the partnership,
particularly when his partner made so careful a record
of the understanding between the partners that defen·
dant-respondent should not be given such credit.
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\\' c propose an entirt>ly equitable formula for detennining the amount of defendant's lien. \Ve believe
tlw evidt'nte is dear and convincing that one-fourth
of the money raisPd hy the Dayton Mortgage was used
to satisfy a partnership mortgage. One-fourth of the
$3,002.50 paid to recover the property from the Daytons
was therefon~ a partnership obligation, and defendant
should get no credit for the partnership's having paid
that.
Of the rcmammg $4,364.00, defendant should get
r1w1it only for the part of it which would have been
distrihnkd to him if it hadn't been so expended. On the
hasis of the partnership's capital accounts, it is assumed
his share would have been 41.682 per cent.
The record shows that defendant-respondent reet>iv~d $250.00 for granting a right of way across the
property. vV e believe this amount should be deducted
from the amount of his lien.
Finally, we believe the rights of the plaintiffs-ap1wllants should not be subject to forfeit if they cannot
prodnee the amount of the lien. We believe the lien
should be foreclosed in the manner provided by statute.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANK J. ALLEN
THOMASC. CUTHBERT
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants

31

